

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX A

WESTERN EUROPE

The following questions have been considered with reference to foreign reactions to the recent Stalin proposals for conversations with President Truman:

- (1) Will it cause the Government to change its present policy in regard to the East-West struggle?
- (2) Will it cause the people to bring pressure on their Government to alter its policy in regard to the East-West struggle?
- (3) If the Government does not alter its policy, will it lose popular support?
- (4) What evidence have you received to date?

Western Europe estimates that the reaction will be as follows:

1. France.

1. No. However, continued close cooperation of the French Government will be conditional upon close consultation among the Western Allies on any important actions or exchange of notes.

2. No. A large majority of the population appears thoroughly cynical with respect to the Stalin proposal. The Communists and fellow travellers will, of course, continue to exploit this phase of the "peace offensive", and some actively pacifist organizations such as the Gary Davis group may bring pressure on the Government to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward the USSR.

3. No. Not any appreciable portion of its present support.

4. Statements by Premier Queuille (first Western spokesman to comment on Stalin "peace overture"), Foreign Minister Schuman, and extensive press reaction, reported in greater detail than usual by Paris Embassy.

2. Western Germany.

1. Although the Stalin interview had little or no effect upon the Land governments, the impact on the German politicians at the Bonn Parliamentary Council was reported to be considerable. The President of the Council, Dr. Adenauer, is reported to have called a meeting of Minister

~~SECRET~~

Presidents to discuss the effect of the Stalin proposals on the creation of a western German government. It makes a good bargaining point for the Germans, who give credence to rumors of a US-USSR agreement at their expense.

2. No. German press reaction, except for Communist newspapers, was uniformly skeptical about sincerity of Stalin proposition, although some papers questioned the advisability of going ahead with plans for a western German government at this time.

3. No. Public is apathetic, and politicians are jockeying for position vis-a-vis Military Government.

4. Three State cables from USPOLAD Berlin on German press summary. Two State cables from US Consul Bremen on Bonn reaction.

3. Italy.

1. No. The Government will find it necessary, however, to make clear to the population that the Italian Government welcomes any positive step which would ease the tension between East and West.

2. Yes. In addition to intensified opposition from the extreme left, many of the moderate Socialists and certain Left-Wing Christian Democrats will feel justified in continuing pressure on their Cabinet representatives to oppose military commitments to the West.

3. No. The Government will not necessarily lose popular support if it acts as in paragraph (1) above. Popular support of the Government will be conditioned by many other factors besides foreign policy, most prominently by the Government's success in handling problems of domestic economic welfare.

4. A Foreign Office spokesman; The New York Times; [REDACTED] at recent moderate Socialist (PSLI) Congress, only 18% voted in favor of calling on the Government to line up definitely with the West; [REDACTED]

4. Netherlands.

1. No.

2. No. Unless the Soviet "peace offensive" is continued over a long period of time with concrete evidence of a desire to reach agreement on outstanding issues.

3. No. Except possibly under condition stated in 2.

~~SECRET~~

4. Only evidence to date has been Dutch press comment. General tone of non-Communist press is one of extreme skepticism. Official Labor, Catholic and small rightist parties' papers cite various probable Soviet motives, all ulterior, for Stalin's statement, several asking for deeds and not words.

5. Austria.

1. No. Austrians have consistently pointed out that Soviet agreement on an Austrian treaty would best furnish concrete evidence of intentions to ease the East-West tension.

2. No.

3. No.

4. No evidence received to date on the recent proposals.

6. Spain.

1. No. The Government will continue its intense opposition to the USSR and the expansion of Communism. The Government believes that the menace of Communism should be met with militant intransigence. The controlled press, therefore, probably will deplore any statements or acts which can be interpreted as "weakening" of the US attitude toward the USSR or as an evidence of US gullibility, warning that trickery and deceit underlie any conciliatory gesture by the USSR, and will seek to impress the Spanish people that for these reasons the prospect of an East-West war, in which Spain would be a primary object of attack by the USSR, continues to be "inevitable."

2. No. The Spanish people have no means of bringing pressure on their Government.

3. No. The Government does not depend for its strength on popular support. The majority of the conservative elements, particularly the Army, on whose support it does depend, concur in this policy.

4. No evidence.

7. Belgium.

1. No.

2. No - Unless the Soviet "peace offensive" is continued over a long period of time with concrete evidence of a desire to reach agreement on outstanding issues.

3. No. - Except possibly under condition stated in 2.

~~SECRET~~

4. Only evidence to date has been Belgian press comment. Non-Communist press views Stalin proposal with skepticism, linking it with USSR attempt to "pressure" Norway and an "all out" campaign to prevent formation of the Atlantic Pact and to block West German Government.

8. Portugal.

1. No. The Government will continue its anti-Communist stand.
2. No. The people have no way of influencing the Government.
3. No. The Government is not dependent on popular support, but on the support of the Army, which is strongly anti-Communist.
4. No reports have yet been received.

9. Switzerland.

1. No.
2. No.
3. No.
4. Only evidence to date has been Swiss press comment, previous to Stalin's proposals, on possibility of "peace offensive." Skepticism was expressed that there really was a "peace offensive" on basis of statements of Italian and French Communists.

In conclusion, it should be noted that Western Europe and countries in general are torn between conflicting emotions springing from:

- (1) The fear that they will become involved in a war between the US and the USSR - which leads them to want peace at almost any price.
- (2) The fear that bilateral US-USSR negotiations will result in an International "deal" in which they will be victimized.
- (3) The fear that the US is "gullible" and will allow itself to be out-manuevered diplomatically - to the detriment of the foreign supporters of US policy.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX B

NORTHERN COUNTRIES

1. United Kingdom.

Early British reactions to the US response to the Stalin interviews, according to limited reports, indicate that the UK is fully satisfied. There is indication that British officials, however, are on the watch for retaliatory Soviet actions.

The UK always appears somewhat nervous when opportunities are raised for bilateral US-USSR negotiations, and is of course gratified to be reassured that the US will not omit British officials from negotiations in which there is a vital British interest. The UK likewise has faith in normal diplomatic processes, and is skeptical of extraordinary procedures. US rejection of the terms of Stalin's offer, and indication of the available normal channels, should therefore also be gratifying.

British opinion on the issues appears to correspond generally with that of the US; i.e., they have come to look on Stalin interviews with skepticism, and to demand actions as well as words in demonstration of good faith. Failing such actions, the oracular expressions from the Kremlin are overwhelmingly considered to be propaganda.

2. Ireland.

No direct evidence yet available.

On the basis of Irish reaction to similar events of the past, it is believed that Irish public opinion, while anxious for a settlement of Great Power differences, will approve the position taken by the US.

3. The Union of South Africa.

No direct evidence is yet available.

The Union of South Africa has been in continuous sympathy with the US position regard the USSR, and South African reactions to the US response to the Stalin statements are probably overwhelmingly favorable.

~~SECRET~~

4. Sweden.

No direct evidence available.

Swedish press comments on Stalin's interview treated it with skepticism as another move in the Soviet peace offensive designed to forestall an Atlantic Pact and to confuse the West. It is therefore unlikely that Swedish opinion will be otherwise than mildly favorable to the US reaction.

5. Norway.

No evidence available

6. Denmark.

No evidence available.

7. Canada.

No evidence available.

It is not expected that the Canadian reaction will differ from that of US public and official opinion. The following quotation from a speech made on 20 January by L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, is appropriate: "Let us not be deceived by phony olive branches, which now seem to be waving here and there in Europe on orders from Moscow."

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

EASTERN EUROPE

1. USSR.

The Government will naturally back Stalin to the hilt. The people, who generally know nothing but Soviet propaganda, will be deeply disappointed by "US rejection of Soviet peace overtures."

2. Satellites.

The Governments will back Stalin to the hilt, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia. Even the Yugoslav Government will profess support for Stalin proposal. The majority of people will be disappointed in the "US rejection of Soviet peace overtures," because they believe that the chances for peace are being lessened. There are many people in the area, however, who will welcome the US rejection because they feel the only chance of salvation lies in a war between the Soviet Union and the US.

~~SECRET~~
APPENDIX D

NEAR EAST/AFRICA

1. Greece.

a. Known reaction: The press is skeptical and unenthusiastic, feeling positive acts are needed to prove that the Soviets are not trying to defeat the Atlantic Pact and western union.

b. Probable reaction: The press reaction represents a practically universal Greek distrust of Soviet intentions, and a feeling that the first token of a Soviet change of heart would have to be relaxation of Soviet-satellite pressure in Greece. The Greeks regard the Stalin statements in the same light as the Markos peace proposals, as propaganda aimed at discrediting or weakening their opponents.

2. Turkey.

a. Known reaction: Editorials so far reported are very skeptical although one Istanbul writer believes he perceives an oral softening in face of "Truman realism."

b. Probable reaction: The Turkish Government and people, as usual, will lead the field in open skepticism. They are highly likely to regard it as another Soviet propaganda move released for the usual ulterior motives. They would advocate prompt, even contemptuous, rejection and a demand for conciliatory Soviet deeds, not words. (Note: There is likely also to be censure of the US press (DWS) for its possibly mischievous irresponsibility in presenting Stalin with this opportunity.)

3. Arab States.

a. Known reaction: None.

b. Probable reaction: Probably too much concerned with Palestine and internal problems for any marked public reaction. Privately, most responsible Arab statesmen will probably be skeptical of Soviet good faith. They will probably also interpret it as a further attempt of the great powers to ignore and by-pass the UN.

4. Israel.

a. Known reaction: None.

b. Probable reaction: Officially, Israel, which is attempting to pursue a policy of friendship toward both East and West may be expected to greet the proposal as a step toward better US-Soviet understanding. Israel's numerous political parties and factions will react according to their several orientations.

~~SECRET~~

5. Iran.

a. Known reaction: So far there is no material available which conveys the reactions of the government, press, and other important elements in Iran.

b. Probable reaction: The Shah and the government, and most of the controlling political leaders will probably view Stalin's "peace interview" with much the same skepticism as expressed in the US. Iranian leftists, as largely represented by the Tudeh Party, taking its cue from Moscow, will revile US failure to accept Stalin's proposal. Advocates of a neutral policy will probably also support it. Extreme nationalists and political opponents of the present government may back the proposal as a measure of muddying internal political waters.

6. India.

a. Known reaction: Prime Minister Nehru has privately expressed the hope that the US would handle the Stalin statement so as to avoid giving large sections of Asiatic public opinion the impression that a friendly gesture was being rejected. Nehru said he couldn't judge whether Stalin was acting in good faith in making the gesture but felt that the US ought to make sure to place the responsibility for any further rift squarely on the USSR. He pointed out that the Soviets manipulated the situation last summer so as to give many Indians the lasting impression that the US was in the wrong.

b. Probable reaction: No press comment available, though it will probably follow the lines suggested by Nehru. The Communists, of course, can be expected to follow their usual line.

7. Pakistan.

a. Known reaction: There are as yet no known reactions of the Pakistan government, press, or other important elements in the country.

b. Probable reaction: While it is believed that the Pakistan reaction will be somewhat comparable to that of India, it is anticipated that the pro-Western bias exhibited by Pakistan will induce the government on the whole to approve US action. It will be hoped that the "peace offer" will be handled in such a way as to not give the Asian countries the impression that the US is rebuffing a friendly Russian gesture. Leftist elements in the press will, probably, seize upon the opportunity to play up the "war mongering Americans" and point out that the tension between the US and USSR is the fault of the US.

8. Afghanistan.

a. Known reaction: There are as yet no known reactions of the Afghan government, press, or other elements.

~~SECRET~~

b. Probable reaction: In line with Afghanistan's realistic appreciation of USSR techniques and probable intentions, it may be anticipated that Afghanistan will on the whole approve the direct and blunt official position taken by the US on Stalin's "peace interview." The entire matter will probably be given no official, and very little unofficial recognition in Afghanistan.

9. Liberia.

a. Known reaction: None.

b. Probable reaction: Will follow US reaction if any.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX E

FAR EAST

Up to the present there has been practically no reaction either official or unofficial to the present Soviet peace offensive and the United States reaction thereto. Far Eastern governments and peoples are so numerous and their problems so complex that the reactions would vary in each country or area, depending upon the present orientation of the governments and peoples. In general, however, it is the opinion of this Branch that except for some Communist exploitation of the propaganda value of these current events, the Far East is so preoccupied in its own immediate problems that no strong reaction one way or the other is to be expected.

~~SECRET~~
APPENDIX F

LATIN AMERICA

1. FBIB has reported no radio comments in LA on Stalin's answer to the Kingsbury Smith questions, nor have any cables from embassies in our area given any comments.

2. We expect no decided reaction in our area except from Communist and other pro-Soviet sources, who will play up Soviet good intentions and condemn the US for not accepting immediately, according to the rule book. There will be general comment to the effect that it would be desirable if the US and the USSR could come to terms, with some mention of the danger of grasping apparent Soviet olive branches. Stalin's admitted poor health will cause speculation.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX G

NOTE

The political leanings and connections of the journals quoted in this report are not given, but they are of significance in evaluating the statements attributed to them.

Page 7, line 4 et seq., beginning "DENA ..." should read as follows:

DENA, U.S.-zone German press service, quotes the Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG as asserting "Stalin's interview reveals genuine anxiety about the rallying of the west." A Baden-Baden commentator, Fred Simson, declares the interview was given at a "psychologically favorable" time, for it "coincides" with Russian censure of the Atlantic Pact.